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Research Abstract: Despite the proliferation of lists and rankings that recognize firms for
superior performance, empirical studies have been limited in their ability to causally evaluate
how inclusion for the marginal firm influences shareholder value. Using a regression
discontinuity design, we address this limitation by examining how investors responded to firms
that were just barely included or excluded from the 100 Best Corporate Citizens list. Contrary to
prevailing theoretical expectations, our findings indicate that marginal firms that were included
in the ranking experienced negative abnormal returns compared to marginal firms that were
excluded. We discuss how these findings inspire future research on rankings and status and
highlight implications for managers considering strategic decisions related to pursuing rankings.
Managerial Abstract: Because being ranked is generally seen as an important strategic
objective for companies, executives must carefully consider how much attention and resources to
allocate towards this pursuit. Although existing research suggests that being ranked can be
beneficial, we have a limited understanding about whether barely making a ranked list is worth
the effort. We provide new insights for executives by showing that investors respond negatively
to marginal inclusion on a ranking but also provide suggestions for how companies might
counteract this effect. Specifically, our results suggest that making consistent, focused
investments that are relevant to external stakeholders may buffer organizations from the potential
negative effects of marginal inclusion on a ranking. These insights may also inspire executives to
reconsider their firms’ commitments to being ranked.
Keywords: rankings, status, reputation, regression discontinuity, corporate social responsibility
INTRODUCTION
Corporate lists that rank and recognize firms for superior performance have proliferated in
recent years (Espeland and Sauder, 2016; Fombrun, 2007; Sadowski, Whitaker, and
Buckingham, 2010). Consistent with this trend, an increasing number of CEOs and other top
managers are prioritizing efforts to gain inclusion on such lists (Gunther, 2010; Lewis, Walls,
and Dowell, 2014; Sadowski, 2010). Indeed, a quick glance at annual reports of large public
corporations reveals an intense competition among companies for inclusion on prominent
rankings such as the 100 Best Places to Work (Dineen and Allen, 2016), the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; Hawn, Chatterji, and Mitchell, 2018), or the 100
Best Corporate Citizens list (Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2009). These trends suggest that
managers see rankings as a valuable strategic asset and will invest significant resources and
attention towards inclusion on these prestigious lists (Espeland and Sauder, 2007).
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To date, the literature on rankings has generally assumed that the consequence of inclusion
on a ranked-list is bimodal in that it produces unequal benefits for ranked firms relative to the
unranked (Azoulay, Stuart, and Wang, 2014; Merton, 1968; Podolny, 2010) and that this effect is
most salient for firms at the margins. Referred to as “the Matthew effect” (Merton, 1968: 3), this
notion that rankings produce disproportionate compounding benefits to award recipients
compared with essentially equivalent unrecognized peers has largely become taken for granted
by both scholars and practitioners (Piezunka et al., 2018; Reschke, Azoulay, and Stuart, 2017).
Despite these prevailing theoretical assumptions, few empirical analyses have been able to
causally examine whether marginal inclusion on a ranked list is beneficial. Consequently,
companies often seek recognition “without clearly knowing whether they will derive benefits” or
“whether recognition has potential downsides” (Dineen and Allen, 2016: 92). This raises an
important empirical question: Are companies that are on the margin better off being included or
excluded from a ranked list?1
To address this question, we examine how investors respond to firms’ marginal inclusion on
a prestigious ranking. Although other studies have examined the average effect of being ranked
(Brammer et al., 2009; Edmans, 2011; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Lyon and Shimshack,
2015), most have been limited in their ability to draw causal inferences about firms on the
margin, primarily because they have not been able to access the list of firms that were barely
excluded (Hawn et al., 2018). We address this methodological limitation by examining the effect
of inclusion on shareholder value for marginal firms that barely make or barely miss the Best
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We define a ranking as relative rank-ordering of actors against one another that confers award like status upon
recipients (Graffin and Ward, 2010). We also distinguish rankings from ratings or accreditations where
organizations are assessed relative to a general standard instead of being compared against other organizations under
consideration. Although some rankings may include all firms under consideration, we focus exclusively on those
that are finite in length (i.e. lists) and have a defined threshold for inclusion (e.g. Best 100, Top 50, etc.) (Rossman
and Schilke, 2014). Consequently, we use the terms “rankings” and “lists” interchangeably.
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Corporate Citizens (100 BCC) list, a prominent ranking that evaluates the corporate social
performance of public corporations. Because we are able to identify similar firms around the
inclusion threshold, we can treat inclusion on the list as akin to a random assignment (Flammer,
2015a), a necessary element of causal inference. This approach of comparing outcomes for
marginal firms around a discontinuous threshold is known as regression discontinuity (RD).
Our primary result departs from prevailing theoretical expectations and suggests that
inclusion on the 100 BCC list can in some cases decrease shareholder value for firms just above
the threshold. On the day of announcement, we find that firms that barely make the list
experience a negative 1.3% abnormal return relative to firms that barely miss the cut. To better
understand the boundary conditions of this result, we also examine whether individual firm
characteristics correlated with a firm’s reputation for corporate social responsibility (CSR) may
moderate how investors respond to the ranking. These effects, we maintain, help to explain why
and when marginal firms might be buffered from negative evaluations by investors for just
barely gaining inclusion in the ranking.
Theoretically, we believe that through a process of commensuration, ranking systems may
distill and simplify complex information into a new category that groups together similar actors
and allows for easier comparison of actors within that category (Bowers, 2015; Espeland and
Stevens, 1998; Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury, 2017; Shocker et al., 1991). This comparison, we
suspect, magnifies the relative weaknesses of bottom-ranked firms by making the performance
disparity between and top-ranked firms more salient. Taken together, we suggest that the
categorization and reevaluation of marginally ranked firms may lead to a liability of comparison
whereby investors devalue low-ranked members of a high-status category (Leclerc, Hsee, and
Nunes, 2005).
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In summary, we believe this surprising negative effect of marginal inclusion on a ranking has
several important theoretical and practical implications for scholars and managers. First, these
results motivate the reconsideration of common theoretical assumptions about the benefits of
rankings and status and directly speak to recent work on unearned status gains and losses.
Second, our findings help reconcile tension in the literature about the impact of CSR on firm
performance by highlighting the need to distinguish between CSR implementation and CSR
recognition. Third, our results suggest that marginally included firms may protect themselves
from devaluations by taking a focused, consistent, and relevant approach to reputational
investments. Although our primary result is not generalizable to all public firms, the fact that we
do find robust support within this context suggests that similar findings may occur with other
rankings. Given the proliferation of rankings, we thus call for scholars to perform additional
studies to determine whether and when similar liabilities for marginally ranked firms might
occur.
THIRD-PARTY RECOGNITION AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Research on the effects of third-party recognition paints a fairly consistent picture; receiving
an award, making it on a prestigious list, or achieving a high rank are assumed to provide
unequal benefits to winners, compared to similar others who are not recognized (Elsbach and
Kramer, 1996; Rindova et al., 2005; Rossman and Schilke, 2014; Waguespack and Sorenson,
2011). Empirically, research on the financial effects of receiving awards generally supports these
arguments. For example, studies indicate that investors respond positively to news about awards
for diversity (Wright et al., 1995), quality (Hendricks and Singhal, 1996), and environmental
performance (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). Other studies report financial benefits for
organizations included on prominent lists such as the 100 Best Companies for Working Mothers
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(Jones and Murrell, 2001), the 100 Best Corporate Citizens (Brammer et al., 2009), and the 100
Best Companies to Work For (Edmans, 2011; Fulmer, Gerhart, and Scott, 2003). In general,
these studies show that being included on a ranked list can generate significant short- and longterm financial benefits, even after controlling for other observable characteristics.
Given the purported benefits of third-party recognition, it should be of no surprise that
companies and their executives increasingly strive to be recognized on such lists. Carlos and
Lewis (2018), for example, noted how companies explicitly set goals to be included or remain on
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI). Dineen and Allen (2016), likewise, found that
companies will spend significant amounts of time and resources and make substantial changes to
their employee benefits in order to compete for a spot on a list such as Fortune’s 100 Best
Companies to Work For. Highlighting this motivation to be recognized, one critic commented
that companies “put a lot of time into checking their data” and “do their best to hit the right data
points” to increase their likelihood of inclusion (Gunther, 2010). Because of the importance that
executives appear to place on such achievements, it is important to understand empirically
whether inclusion on a ranked list actually matters.
Although companies are attracted to such lists for their obvious marketing appeal, few
empirical investigations have convincingly addressed whether marginal inclusion on a
prestigious list is actually beneficial (Dineen and Allen, 2016). To date, the primary research
design employed to analyze the financial benefits of list inclusion has been an event study. While
such studies can provide valuable information about the average effect of list inclusion, they
typically do not evaluate the abnormal returns of similar companies that do not make the cut
(Hawn et al., 2018), often because the information is proprietary or not available to the public.
By ignoring the unranked or unlisted firms, researchers thus limit their ability to empirically
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examine whether a firm that barely makes a list is actually better off than a firm that is barely
excluded. Indeed, such knowledge could be extremely valuable for managers who wonder if
their firm’s inclusion on a list will derive any benefits and question whether their firm should
enter, re-enter, or exit these competitions (Dineen and Allen, 2016).
DATA AND METHODS
Context
To examine this empirical question, we study investor response to marginal inclusion on the
100 Best Corporate Citizens (100 BCC) list. Established by the magazine Business Ethics in the
year 2000, the 100 BCC list was the first prominent ranking of corporate citizenship for large
public corporations. Certainly awards, prizes, and other forms of recognition were given for superior
corporate citizenship prior to 2000, but we found no evidence of a systematic evaluation and subsequent
ranking of similar scale prior to the 100 BCC list.2

The stated objective of publicizing the 100 BCC list was to “move corporations toward everbetter practices” by “pushing the envelope on what represents good citizenship” (Waddock,
Graves, and Kelly, 2000: 17). Implicit in this statement is an assumption that being included on
the list can generate substantial recognition and notoriety which can consequently spur imitation
and improvement among the excluded firms (Fombrun, 1996; Lewis, 2017).
Although the 100 BCC list has been published annually since the year 2000, we focus our
analysis on the initial year the list was published for three reasons. First, studying the emergence
of a new ranking increases the likelihood of observing investors’ reactions to novel information
(Brammer et al., 2009), an essential assumption of an event study (McWilliams and Siegel,

2

Other prominent lists in existence included the Domini Social 400 index, a stock index constructed in 1990 by
KLD to track the costs and benefits of applying social criteria to investment (Godfrey, 2011), and the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index (DJSI), established in 1999. Unlike the 100 BCC, the DS 400 and the DJSI were stock indices,
not rankings. Consequently, an investor would only know whether a firm was included on the index, but would not
know the firm’s relative ranking within the index (Graffin and Ward, 2010).

6

1997). Second, once the criteria for making the list is known, motivated firms may be able to
game the system (Gunther, 2010) which could invalidate our assumption of quasi-randomized
treatment (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), also an essential component of our research design.
Focusing on the inaugural year thus reduces the chance that self-selection could bias our results.
Third, using the initial year helps to isolate the effect of recognition bestowed by a ranking from
other information about firm performance that may have been previously available.
The inaugural 100 BCC ranking was constructed using social ratings data from the Kinder,
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Socrates database. At that time, KLD’s evaluation universe
included members of the S&P 500 and Domini 400 indices (approximately 650 firms). Eligible
firms were evaluated based on relations with communities, customers, employees, and
shareholders from 1996-1998. An overall score was computed by averaging each category over
the three-year period in order to smooth year-to-year fluctuations. We describe the rankings
process and display a snapshot of the initial 100 BCC list and breakdown by industry in Tables
A1-A2 in the Appendix.
KLD evaluated 658 firms in 1998, the final data year used to construct the inaugural ranking
in 2000. Of these 658 firms, 110 were not considered eligible because they had been evaluated
by KLD less than the required three years. An additional seven firms were dropped from
consideration because of recent events that would contradict the signal of superior corporate
citizenship (Waddock et al., 2000). These removals left 541 firms that were evaluated and
ranked by Business Ethics magazine. Of these remaining ranked firms, 28 had their stocks
delisted prior to the announcement date largely because they were acquired. Our final sample
consists of these 513 firms that were (1) ranked by Business Ethics and (2) had stocks that were
actively being traded on the announcement day.
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Unlike prior research that has examined investor response to CSR rankings and lists
(Brammer et al., 2009; Edmans, 2011; Fulmer et al., 2003; Hawn et al., 2018; Lyon and
Shimshack, 2015), our identification strategy relies on understanding the social performance of
firms that were not only included on the 100 BCC list, but also those that fell just outside of the
top 100. Although the total scores used to rank firms were not publicly available for firms that
were excluded from the 100 BCC list, we were able to obtain these scores directly from Sandra
Waddock and Samuel Graves (Waddock et al., 2000), the two-primary academic researchers
who had performed the ranking analysis for the magazine. Obtaining these data was necessary to
understand which firms were similar to 100 BCC members but barely missed the cutoff.
Method
To evaluate the investor response to CSR recognition, we adapt an empirically rigorous
research design known as regression discontinuity (RD) to the analysis of stock returns in an
event study (Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe, 2012; Flammer, 2015a). RD is a research design that
is noted for its ability to produce reliable estimates of a causal relationship (Calonico et al.,
2017) and is “often seen as the sharpest tool of causal inference since it approximates very
closely the ideal setting of a randomized control experiment” (Flammer and Bansal, 2017: 1828).
Regression Discontinuity in the 100 BCC Ranking. The primary objective of this study is to
estimate the relative effect of 100 BCC inclusion on shareholder value on the announcement day
for firm i. Each firm in the sample is rated using the KLD data and then ranked according to their
overall score Si. The overall score was computed by standardizing and adjusting the raw scores
obtained from Business Ethics so that scores greater than or equal to zero indicate 100 BCC
inclusion. By definition, firms that are ranked 1 through 100 are included on the 100 BCC list
denoted by the indicator variable 𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 1(𝑆𝑖 ≥ 𝑆 ∗ ) where S*is threshold for inclusion.
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In an ideal world, the causal effect of BCCi would be estimated by randomly assigning
inclusion. We use a RD design to approximate this idealized experiment. Central to any RD
design is an assumption that firms just above or below a threshold are essentially the same. In
this context, that threshold for treatment is a top 100 ranking. Assuming that firms that barely
make the list (e.g. a ranking of 100) are similar to firms that were barely excluded (e.g. a ranking
of 101), marginal inclusion on the 100 BCC is thus akin to random assignment and can be used
to test the causal impact of being recognized for CSR on subsequent shareholder value.
We first employ a nonparametric method that analyzes the difference in means between
included and excluded firms in small bandwidths around the inclusion threshold. Following
Flammer (2015a), we then use parametric estimation by employing the following RD
specification to evaluate the causal effect of 100 BCC inclusion
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽 × 𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝑃𝑙 (𝑆𝑖 , 𝛾𝑙 ) + 𝑃𝑟 (𝑆𝑖 , 𝛾𝑟 ) + 𝜀𝑖
where yi is outcome variable of firm i, 𝛽 is the treatment effect of 100 BCC inclusion, 𝑃𝑙 (𝑆𝑖 , 𝛾𝑙 )
and 𝑃𝑟 (𝑆𝑖 , 𝛾𝑟 ) are first-order polynomials on the left and right sides of the inclusion threshold
used to control for differences among non-close firms.3
Event Study of the 100 BCC Ranking. We quantify the impact of marginal inclusion on firm
value using an event study, a method developed to measure the effect of an unanticipated event
on stock prices (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Like all event studies, we assume that financial
markets are efficient which implies that stock prices incorporate all relevant information that is
available to the market. If the market is efficient, novel information that was previously

3

In the Appendix, we provide a brief description about the differences between nonparametric and parametric
estimation. We also demonstrate that our results in parametric estimation are robust to alternative specifications
using second- and third-order polynomials (Table A3).
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unanticipated should generate an abnormal return. We also assume that investors had access to
the ranking once published and incorporated the information accordingly.
Knowledge of the initial 100 BCC ranking was disseminated through a press release issued
by Business Ethics magazine on PR Newswire on March 27, 2000 (Klusmann, 2000). Only the
companies that made the list were published. The remaining firms that were evaluated but not
included were therefore unknown to the public. We searched the Factiva and Lexis-Nexis
databases and found no evidence that the ranking was introduced prior to the announcement date.
This absence of evidence suggests that it was very unlikely that investors anticipated the initial
publication and that the ranking therefore contained novel information.
Because the 100 BCC ranking was determined using data from KLD that was previously
available to investors, one could still question whether the ranking actually provided new
information. While we acknowledge this concern, we also note that (1) prior research has shown
that investors will respond to rankings as novel information even if the underlying data used to
construct the ranking was already available (Lyon and Shimshack, 2015), (2) some investors
were likely uninformed given that access to the underlying KLD data was not free (Brammer et
al., 2009; Godfrey, 2011), and (3) even informed investors can revise their expectations about
the future prospects of the company if they think that the information will be novel to other
stakeholders (consumers, employees, etc.) (Brammer et al., 2009; Lyon and Shimshack, 2015).
Given these factors, we believe that there is a strong likelihood that many investors would
perceive the initial 100 BCC list as novel and respond accordingly.
Variable Definitions and Sample Characteristics
Abnormal Return. We evaluate investor response to inclusion on the 100 BCC list by
computing the abnormal return on the announcement day (Flammer, 2015a). Using an abnormal
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return as the primary dependent variable of interest is appealing because it provides a direct
estimate of the effect that 100 BCC inclusion might have on firm value. Following prior research
(Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Madsen and Rodgers, 2015; McWilliams and Siegel,
1997), we compute abnormal returns using the market model which calculates expected returns
by regressing a firm’s daily stock return against a market portfolio over a period of time prior to
the announcement day. As a robustness test, we also compute abnormal returns using the marketadjusted model and obtain substantively similar results. Consistent with prior work, we used a
255-day estimation window ending 46 days before the event and the CRSP value-weighted
market portfolio.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Summary Statistics. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the abnormal return on the
announcement day as well as other relevant firm characteristics commonly used to assess
similarity between firms (Flammer, 2015a, 2015b). We construct an overall measure of corporate
citizenship (KLD Index) by summing a firm’s strengths and concerns along the following
dimensions: customers, communities, the natural environment, minorities, and employees
(Waddock et al., 2000). Total assets is the book value of assets. Market value is the number of
shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the end of the fiscal year prior to
announcement day. Return on Assets (ROA) is measured as the ratio of net income to book value
of assets. Cash is the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the
ratio of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt to total assets. Institutional Ownership is the
proportion of shares owned by institutional investors. Analyst Coverage is the number of unique
analyst estimates in the I/B/E/S database in the prior year. DS 400 and DJSI are indicator
variables equal to 1 if the firm was a member of the Domini Social 400 Index or the Dow Jones
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Sustainability Index respectively, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we use 4-digit SIC codes to identify
firms whose customers are primarily other businesses (Srinivasan, Lilien, and Sridhar, 2011).
Specifically, we create B2B industry, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company operates in
a business-to-business (B2B) industry and 0 otherwise.
Tests for Quasi-Randomized Assignment
To test for quasi-random assignment, we evaluate (1) the continuity of BCC scores around
the inclusion threshold and (2) the similarity of firms immediately in the treatment and control
groups based on ex-ante characteristics.
Continuity in the Distribution of BCC Scores. We first examine whether the distribution of
the overall score Si is continuous around the inclusion threshold. Discontinuities in the overall
score around the threshold likely provide evidence of ratings manipulation which call into
question the assumption of quasi-random assignment.
As shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix, the distribution of BCC scores appears normal and
continuous around the inclusion threshold. We evaluate this condition more formally using the
rddensity command, a STATA command introduced by Cattaneo et al. (2017) that tests for
evidence of manipulation (i.e. discontinuity in the BCC score at the inclusion threshold). As can
be seen in Figure A2 in the Appendix, we find no evidence to reject the null of a continuous
distribution (p-value = 0.743) thus supporting our assumption of a quasi-randomized treatment.
Preexisting differences. We also examine whether firms just above and below the inclusion
threshold are similar on relevant ex-ante characteristics. We expect to find no significant
differences among these firms if inclusion near the cutoff is indeed as good as random.
We test for significant differences among marginal firms using all of the aforementioned
variables. We display the results of our tests in Table 2. To determine the optimal bin-width for
analysis, we used the STATA command rdrobust and its companion command rdbwselect (Calonico et
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al., 2017; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014). We found the optimal bin-width to be a window of +/20 ranks. Firms that fall within this range are what we consider “marginal” firms. We report an additional
window of +/- 30 ranks to demonstrate how bias can increase with increasing distance from the threshold.

As shown in column (1), we find that firms that are included on the 100 BCC list differ
significantly from companies that are excluded as one would expect. In column (2), we see that
most of these differences become insignificant at a distance of 30 ranks, with the exception of
membership on the DS 400 index. In column (3), we narrow the threshold to a distance of 20
ranks and discover no significant differences among marginally included or excluded firms.
These results are consistent with the full sample RDD specification in column (4) that controls
for distance from the threshold. As supporting evidence, we also plot each covariate against the
overall BCC score and find no indication of significant discontinuities at threshold as shown in
Figure A3 of the Appendix. Jointly, these results are consistent with our assumption that
inclusion is approximately random and thus provide further support for our identification
strategy.
<Insert Table 2 here>
RESULTS
Main Results
Graphical Analysis. To measure the impact of 100 BCC inclusion on shareholder value, we
examine the stock market reaction on the day that the rankings were announced. Figure 1
provides a visualization of this impact. Specifically, the figure plots the abnormal returns against
the overall BCC score. The solid vertical line represents the threshold for inclusion on the BCC
list. Firms to the right of the inclusion threshold were included on the 100 BCC while those to
the left were excluded. Each dot represents the average abnormal return within an optimized bin-
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width on each side of the threshold. The solid lines plot predicted values of abnormal returns
from first-order polynomials in the 100 BCC score to the left and right of the inclusion threshold.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
Looking at the predicted values to the left of the threshold, we see that excluded firms do not
appear to garner any significant investor response as one would expect given that on average, no
news is being publicized about these firms that would lead to a significant abnormal return. To
the right of the threshold, however, we see a positively sloping line suggesting that returns,
relatively speaking, increase with higher 100 BCC scores and thus higher rank. This result is
entirely consistent with recent research that examines the relationship between rank and
shareholder value (Lyon and Shimshack, 2015) and suggests that many investors found the
ranking to contain novel information, despite being based on data that was previously available
to the public. The most interesting aspect of the graph, however, is the discontinuous drop at the
inclusion threshold. Indeed, this drop suggests that firms that just barely make the list experience
a decrease in firm value compared to firms that just miss the cutoff.
Regression Analysis. The graphical analysis in Figure 1 suggests that inclusion on the 100
BCC list leads to a decrease in shareholder value for marginal firms. We provide a formal test of
this claim in Table 3 using both nonparametric and parametric estimation.
<Insert Table 3 here>
We first report our results using nonparametric estimation which computes estimates of the
difference in abnormal returns between firms that are included and excluded for increasingly
small intervals around the inclusion threshold. In column (1) of Table 3, we examine the full
sample of 513 firms. Consistent with prior work, we find a negative but insignificant effect for
100 BCC inclusion (Brammer et al., 2009). Column (2) restricts the sample to non-close firms,
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that is, firms that were more than 30 ranks from the inclusion threshold. Again, the results show
no discernable difference in abnormal returns between the included and excluded firms, likely
because this subsample is largely composed of excluded firms for whom one would not expect a
market response.
In columns (3) through (4), we restrict the sample to increasingly smaller bin widths around
the inclusion threshold. We use the STATA command rdrobust to compute nonparametric
estimates with triangular kernels that put greater weight on firms closer to the threshold
(Calonico et al., 2017; Calonico et al., 2014; Tian, Smith, and King, 2019). For firms within 30
ranks of the inclusion threshold, we find that the difference in abnormal returns is -2.2% (p =
0.007). For firms within 20 ranks, the optimal bin-width, we see the difference between included
and excluded firm increases in magnitude to -2.7% (p = 0.007). Overall, the results displayed in
columns (3) - (4) indicate that firms who barely make the 100 BCC list experience a significant
decrease in shareholder value compared to firms that barely miss the cut.
We also report our results using parametric estimates in Table 3. In column (5), we run our
primary RD regression that controls for the distance from the inclusion threshold using firstorder polynomials. Unlike the nonparametric estimates listed in columns (3) through (4), this
model incorporates the full sample of firms (N = 513) and thus provides a more efficient and
precise estimate of the causal effect of marginal inclusion on abnormal returns. Similar to the
nonparametric results in columns (3) and (4), we find a statistically significant -1.3% difference
between included and excluded firms, even after controlling for distance from the inclusion
threshold. Although this magnitude may seem small, we found it to be consistent with other
events studies that examine investor responses to CSR-related information (Flammer, 2015a;
Flammer and Bansal, 2017). Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that inclusion
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on the 100 BCC list leads to a decrease in firm value for marginal firms. In the Appendix, we
demonstrate that this finding is robust to a number of additional sensitivity tests.
Moderating Effects: CSR Specificity, Consistency, and Relevancy
Our initial results suggest that marginal inclusion on the 100 BCC list can be detrimental to
firm value. We suspect, however, that investor reactions to a ranked list may also be moderated
by other salient firm characteristics that are not captured by the ranking, namely a firm’s prior
reputation (Kim and King, 2014). Prior research, for example, suggests that firms that engage in
predictable patterns of organizational outcomes and behaviors that are relevant to specific
audience interests become “known for something” (Jensen, Kim, and Kim, 2012; Lange, Lee,
and Dai, 2011) which helps to establish a domain-specific reputation among key stakeholders
(Carlos and Lewis, 2018; McDonnell and King, 2018). Such a reputation could enhance firm
value by leading to increased revenues (Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010) or reduced
capital costs (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014) or a preservation of firm’s value when
experiencing a negative event (Flammer, 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009; Luo, Kaul, and Seo, 2018),
all outcomes valued by investors (Fombrun, 1996; Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova, 2010; Rhee
and Haunschild, 2006). Because investors may be more willing to accept a firm’s CSR
investments if the connection between the investment and some valued outcome such as
reputation is more salient, we suspect that marginally included firms with strong reputations for
CSR may be less likely to be devalued when barely making the 100 BCC list.
Accordingly, we examine three antecedents to a socially responsible reputation that may
explain investors’ varying responses, namely the specificity, consistency, and relevance of a
firm’s CSR investments (Lange et al., 2011). First, we expect that firms that make concentrated
or focused investments in specific dimensions of CSR are more likely to generate a domain-
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specific reputation for CSR relative to other firms that engage in more general or diverse
behaviors (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; Jensen et al., 2012). Second, we anticipate that an
established history of consistent socially responsible behavior is more likely to be perceived as
genuine by stakeholders which may lead to higher levels of reputational capital amongst
investors (Barnett, 2007; Godfrey, 2005). Third, we predict that engaging in activities that are
relevant and viewed as material by key stakeholders can help to strengthen a company’s
reputation amongst that audience (Khan, Serafeim, and Yoon, 2016; Rindova and Martins,
2012). Collectively, we suspect that these three factors represent antecedents of a socially
responsible reputation that are likely to attenuate the negative investor response to marginally
included firms.
We examine each of these moderating effects in Panel B of Table 3. We first evaluate the
moderating impact of investing in specific or focused dimensions of CSR. To operationalize this
variable, we compute the standard deviation of ratings among the four stakeholder groups
evaluated by the BCC list: community, employees, customers, and shareholders. Firms that have
concentrated their investments in one particular domain are likely to have a higher standard
deviation than firms whose investments were spread more equally (see the Appendix for an
example). We then split the full sample into two based on a median split of the standard
deviation score for 100 BCC firms. As displayed in columns (1) and (2), the negative effect of
inclusion appears to affect only firms whose CSR investments are less specific (i.e. more
general). Marginal firms that have focused CSR investments appear to be less likely to
experience decreases in firm value, perhaps because they develop domain-specific reputations
(Carlos and Lewis, 2018; McDonnell and King, 2018), which may be more salient to investors.
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We then examine the impact of a prior history of investments in CSR. To evaluate this
history, we compute the change in the KLD index between 1999 (t-1) and 1996 (t-4). We then
classify firms into two groups: (1) those whose change in the KLD index was greater than 0 (No
History of CSR) and (2) those whose change in the KLD index was less than or equal to 0
(History of CSR). Firms with significantly positive differences are not likely to have a wellestablished history of CSR investments (see the Appendix for an example). Based on the results
from columns (3) and (4), it appears that the negative effect of inclusion for marginal firms does
indeed only apply to those firms who lack a strong historical record of CSR investments.
Conversely, marginal firms that do have a relatively strong history of CSR investments appear to
be somewhat protected from the decrease in firm value, likely because consistent investments
over time are more likely to be perceived as credible (Barnett, 2007; Barnett and Salomon, 2012)
and thus generate more reputational capital (Godfrey, 2005).
Finally, we investigate the effect of making relevant or material investments in CSR for
marginal firms. Following recent work by Khan and colleagues (2016), we utilize guidance from
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) to identify material sustainability issues
for companies within the same industry and then map these material issues to the KLD ratings
(see the Appendix for more details). We then compute the ratio of material strengths enacted by
the firm to the number of material strengths assigned to the firm’s industry. Firms with positive
proportions (i.e. those that are making investments in material issues) are deemed as having a
higher level of material CSR investment while firms with a proportion equal to zero are deemed
as making no material CSR investment. As shown in columns (5) and (6), a negative investor
response to marginal inclusion seems to apply to firms that do not invest in material CSR
initiatives. On the other hand, marginal firms that make material CSR seem to be buffered from a
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decrease in firm value, arguably because targeting initiatives that match investors’ interests helps
to build their reputation among shareholders (Khan et al., 2016; Lange et al., 2011).
External Validity
Although the RD design employed in this study is advantageous for identifying the causal
effect of being marginally included on the 100 BCC list, our analysis may be limited in
generalizability given that the effect is identified by a small subset of firms around the inclusion
threshold that, while being similar to each other, may be very different from firms farther away
from the threshold. Likewise, the companies in the 100 BCC evaluation universe may not be
representative of the broader population of public firms from which they are drawn. To address
these concerns, we evaluate (1) whether companies around the inclusion threshold differ
systematically from companies that are farther away and (2) whether the sample of BCC
evaluated firms differs significantly from the broader population of public corporations. We
display the results of these comparisons in Table A10 of the Appendix.
We find that firms near the inclusion threshold have significantly higher levels of corporate
citizenship as measured by the KLD index, are more profitable, and are also more likely to be
members of the DS 400 index. This result, while interesting, is not surprising given that (1) the
100 BCC ranking, by construction, selects approximately the top 20% of firms in terms of
corporate citizenship and shareholder return and (2) the DS 400 is a compilation of socially
responsible companies as determined by KLD (Godfrey, 2011; Waddock et al., 2000). Taken
together, these comparisons suggest that marginal firms near the inclusion threshold may not
necessarily be representative of the broader population from which they were selected (i.e. S&P
500 firms). They do, however, suggest that barely making a list may be detrimental to
shareholder value, but only for companies that appear to be actively investing in the dimension
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of performance that is being ranked. We also find firms evaluated for inclusion on the 100 BCC
to be significantly different from the broader population of public firms. Indeed, firms in the 100
BCC universe are much larger, more profitable, and more likely to be tracked by analysts and
institutional investors. Although these differences do not bias our estimate of the treatment effect
of marginal inclusion, they do suggest that our findings may not apply to the typical US public
firm.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Firms face important strategic decisions about how to manage their resources and attention in
pursuing rankings. Although prior theory generally assumes that rankings bestow
disproportionate benefits to ranked actors (Merton, 1968), empirical support for this causal
relationship is limited. Through our access to a unique dataset and implementation of a novel
empirical design, we found surprising empirical evidence that departs from prevailing theoretical
expectations.
Empirical findings
Utilizing a regression discontinuity design, we examined the effect of marginal inclusion on
the 100 Best Corporate Citizen’s list on shareholder value. Our primary results indicate that
firms that were marginally included on the 100 Best Corporate Citizen’s list experienced a 1.3%
decrease in firm value compared to firms that were marginally excluded. We also sought to
understand the materiality of these results by interpreting the estimated decrease in absolute
terms. Given that the median marginal firm (those within 20 ranks of the inclusion threshold) had
a market value that ranged from $805 million (10th percentile) to $32 billion (90th percentile), the
estimated effect of marginal inclusion of -1.3% would translate to an expected decrease ranging
from $10 million to $416 million in market value, with a median estimate of $83 million.
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From an empirical perspective, our study highlights a potential opportunity for scholars who
study investor responses to rankings and lists. Although many academics have sought to
understand the financial consequences of being included on prestigious lists (Brammer et al.,
2009; Edmans, 2011; Fulmer et al., 2003; Jones and Murrell, 2001; Lyon and Shimshack, 2015),
most of these studies, “do not compare abnormal returns of similar firms that are not on the
index” (Hawn et al., 2018: 950) and are thus limited in their ability to estimate the causal
consequences of inclusion (Flammer, 2015a). Recent studies have sought to address this
limitation by using matching methods to construct a comparable group of control firms (Durand,
Paugam, and Stolowy, 2019; Hawn et al., 2018) but even these studies cannot estimate a true
causal relationship because they lack knowledge about which firms apply but are rejected.
We address this limitation by collecting the underlying performance data for all firms that
were evaluated for the 100 BCC, even those that fell outside of the top 100 ranked firms. Indeed,
this unique access to data is what enabled us to estimate the causal relationship of 100 BCC
inclusion. While access to proprietary data will always be a challenge, many ranking agencies
(e.g. Business Ethics) base their evaluations on public information that is already available (e.g.
KLD). Often all that is needed to reconstruct the ranking for the full population of evaluated
firms is a more in-depth explanation of the third-party’s ranking methodology. We thus
encourage scholars who study rankings and lists, whenever possible, to seek out information on
the ranked but unpublished organizations. Doing so will allow future research to employ rigorous
research designs to estimate causal relationships (Flammer, 2015a; Hawn et al., 2018; Lev et al.,
2010), thus expanding our empirical knowledge about the consequences of being ranked.
Theoretical implications
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Rankings and Status. Our empirical findings represent a surprising departure from prior
theoretical expectations dating back to Merton’s conceptualization of the 41st chair. Using the
example of the French Academy and its limit of only recognizing the top 40 scientists in the
field, Robert Merton identified the 41st chair as “an artifact of having a fixed number of places
available at the summit of recognition” (1968: 2). As he explains, despite generally indiscernible
differences in talent and quality of research, scientists that occupy the 40th chair receive
incommensurate career-propelling benefits compared with peers who were not recognized by the
Academy and thus relegated to the 41st chair.
Although our focus was on the empirical phenomenon, our findings point to an important
theoretical dimension not considered by Merton’s 41st chair analogy, namely the potential for a
liability of comparison that may arise from gaining inclusion in a prominent category. By
grouping together ranked firms into a comparison set, rankings may restructure how firms are
evaluated by focusing audience attention to the comparison of a given firm with the other ranked
firms on the list (Bowers, 2015). As our results suggest, these categorical comparisons may be
detrimental for lower-ranked firms by enhancing the salience of the performance disparity with
higher ranked firms. We see this counterintuitive findin as providing further evidence of the
limits and potential downsides of status (Azoulay et al., 2014; Graffin et al., 2013; Reschke et
al., 2017) and as further motivation to study the implications of competition near status
boundaries (Otner, 2018; Piezunka et al., 2018).
Our results also build directly on recent research that examines how status gains and losses
can occur as a result of structural changes in categories. When status shifts are independent of
substantive changes in firm performance, they are referred to as “unearned” (Bowers and Prato,
2018; Neeley and Dumas, 2016). Although prior research has investigated the impacts of these
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changes on firm outcomes (Bowers and Prato, 2018) and has considered how individuals respond
to experiencing unearned status gains and losses (Neeley and Dumas, 2016), our study may help
to delineate new boundary conditions regarding how audiences interpret and respond to unearned
status gains (George et al., 2016). Consistent with prior research, our results indicate that highly
ranked firms seem to benefit from structural changes that bestow status. However, unlike prior
work, we note that, at the margin, unearned status may represent a liability. Our moderators help
unpack this relationship by indicating that firms that had strong CSR reputations were buffered
from these liabilities. In other words, firms with a prior reputation for CSR were likely viewed as
having “earned” their status gains, compared with those at the margin lacking a reputation for
CSR. From these findings, we surmise that at the margins unearned status gains or losses may be
more likely to be detected by audiences.
Finally, our results contribute to recent conversations regarding the potential liabilities
associated with positive recognition. For example, Kovacs and Sharkey (2014) show that the
ratings of award-winning books tend to decline after those books receive an esteemed award,
primarily because awards broaden the audience for books and in so doing attract more diverse
readers with different tastes. Similar to this research, we find potential negative implications of
awards in the form of rankings. However, our results highlight a potential alternative mechanism.
While Kovacs and Sharkey (2014) link negative outcomes to audience expansion, our findings
suggest that rankings may create a liability of comparison by emphasizing the relative
performance disparity between low and high ranked firms.
Strategic CSR. Our study also speaks to the ongoing conversation regarding the strategic
value of CSR investments. Using a similar research design to our own, recent work has found a
positive causal relationship between CSR and firm value (Flammer, 2015a; Flammer and Bansal,
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2017). Although our results may seem to contradict these previous findings, we believe they
differ in important ways and are thus complementary, not contradictory.
First, we believe these studies differ in their treatments. For example, Flammer and
colleagues examine investor response to the approval and implementation of CSR-related
shareholder proposals (2015a; 2017). Our study, however, focuses on investor response to
recognition of CSR by a third-party. Because we use similar research designs, we suspect that
these different findings are likely a result of the treatment itself: implementation vs. recognition.
Second, we also note that the ratings used to construct the 100 BCC list in the inaugural year
(2000) were based on KLD data that was already publicly available (1996-1998) (Brammer et
al., 2009). Given this observation, if all investors cared about was the implementation of CSR
initiatives, it would be unlikely that we would observe any substantive change in firms’ stock
prices on the day of the 100 BCC announcement given that the performance information
underlying the ranking (i.e. the KLD ratings) was already available. The fact that we see any
response at all is thus further evidence that the 100 BCC recognition changed investors’
perceptions about the present value of the firm independent of what had already been approved
and implemented by the firm (Lyon and Shimshack, 2015).
Taken together, we believe these studies jointly highlight an important conceptual distinction
between CSR implementation and CSR recognition, a difference that has often been overlooked
in the literature, perhaps due to assumptions that firms that engage in socially responsible
initiatives will naturally want to publicize and therefore be recognized for their efforts (Carlos
and Lewis, 2018; Delmas and Grant, 2014). While prior work has found shareholders do value
the approval and implementation of CSR initiatives (Flammer, 2015a; Flammer and Bansal,
2017), based on our results, it appears that that shareholders may also punish firms that fail to
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gain a certain level of recognition or notoriety for their CSR investments. Given these findings,
we thus encourage scholars who study the strategic value of CSR to consider whether their
empirical observation of CSR is an implementation event or a recognition event and how and
why this distinction might lead differing performance results.
Strategic implications for managers
Our primary empirical result suggests that firms that were barely included on the 100 BCC
list experienced a decrease in firm value when the list was announced. Theoretically, we suggest
that these negative effects may stem from a liability of comparison, whereby performance
discrepancies between marginally ranked and top ranked firms are amplified. In the case of a
new non-voluntary ranking, firms may have little control over the set of organizations to which
they are compared. However, our results suggest that one viable strategy to buffer firms from the
risk of a marginal ranking is to establish a strong reputation by engaging in focused and
consistent activities that are relevant to the interests of their primary stakeholders (Lange et al.,
2011).
Indeed, our moderating analysis revealed that marginal firms were immune to negative
investor perceptions when they were known for something specific (Lange et al., 2011), had
pattern or history of consistent investments (Barnett, 2007; Godfrey, 2005), and when they
focused on investments that were relevant and impactful (i.e. material) in the eyes of
shareholders (Khan et al., 2016; Rindova and Martins, 2012). Taken together, these results
provide three key takeaways for managers who desire to compete for a spot on a ranked list but
wish to avoid possible liabilities of marginal inclusion. First, building a domain-specific
reputation (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; McDonnell and King, 2018) may be a good initial strategy
to buffer firms from the potential liability of a low ranking, at least until they acquire sufficient
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resources and capabilities to broaden the dimensions upon which their reputation is based.
Second, given the value of consistency (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Hawn et al., 2018), mangers
should ensure that their firm provides sufficient resources to sustain investments in the evaluated
activities over time. Third, managers should become attuned to the needs and interests of
different stakeholders (Hiatt and Carlos, 2019; Hiatt, Carlos, and Sine, 2018) and consider
whether their investments actually make a material difference.
Managers may also wish to reexamine their firms’ commitment to being ranked. While our
primary analysis focused on the negative effects of marginal inclusion, our findings do seem to
suggest that being ranked near the top of a list could be beneficial, or at least not harmful (see
Figure 1). Given these results, firms that desire to compete for a spot on a particular ranking may
wish to continue making investments that result in a rank that facilitates favorable comparisons
among listed entities. Conversely, firms that have little ability or desire to compete may wish to
redirect their investments to avoid being ranked or perhaps elect not to participate in the ranking
altogether. After all, firms that are lukewarm in their efforts to manage their ranking may find
themselves “stuck in the middle” and subsequently discounted by investors who perceive them to
be bearing the costs of pursuing a ranking without enjoying the benefits (Barnett and Salomon,
2006: 1119).
A Research Agenda: Rankings and the Impact of Marginal Inclusion
Although we are confident in the robustness of our results within the confines of this
particular context, we cannot conclusively ascertain whether or when similar liabilities for
marginally ranked firms would generalize to other rankings. For example, our study focused on a
particular type of ranking (non-voluntary) with one dimension of performance (corporate
citizenship) and a finite number of ranks (100). We also evaluated reactions to marginal
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inclusion by one audience (investors) at one particular point in time in history (the year 2000 and
the first year of the ranking). Given such specificity, one could indeed question whether marginal
inclusion on a ranking with differing elements would generate a similar effect.
Fortunately, given the proliferation of rankings in recent years (Fombrun, 2007), we suspect
there are a number of promising research contexts in which differing structural elements of a
ranking could be examined in order to determine whether this effect generalizes beyond the
current context. For example, future studies could examine how marginally ranked universities
compare to the unranked on outcomes such as alumni donations, applications, placement, etc.
(Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Espeland and Sauder, 2007). Other promising contexts to examine
may include other general firm reputation rankings (Bermiss, Zajac, and King, 2014), the
ranking of hospitals (Pope, 2009), books (Kovács and Sharkey, 2014), hotels (Orlikowski and
Scott, 2014), restaurants (Luca and Zervas, 2016), and automobiles (Rao, 1994). Consequently,
despite limitations in generalizability, we believe this study provides a strong foundation upon
which future research can build in order to understand the reach and limits of our primary
empirical finding. We explore several of these areas of inquiry below.
Ranking Characteristics. First, we suspect that variation in ranking characteristics could
impact the generalizability of our results. For example, one particular aspect of the 100 BCC list
was that firms did not voluntarily apply for inclusion but were rather evaluated and ranked based
on publicly available data. Although other rankings likewise evaluate actors without their
approval, it is also common for firms to apply for inclusion on a ranking by filling out extensive
questionnaires (Carlos and Lewis, 2018; Dineen and Allen, 2016), particularly if they already
excel on the dimension of performance being ranked. Because we find that a prior reputation can
attenuate the negative effect of marginal inclusion, these differences in selection raise questions
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about whether similar findings would extend to rankings that are based on voluntary
applications. One could also consider whether similar findings would apply to other ranked
dimensions of performance. CSR, for example, has historically been viewed as subordinate to the
core functions of the business. Rankings associated with activities more directly connected to
core business operations, such as quality and innovation, could conceivably produce different
results. Future research could therefore examine whether a liability of comparison generalizes to
other ranked dimensions of performance. Last but not least, the number of available spaces on a
ranked-list could impact the prevalence of this negative effect. In this study, that number was
100. Smaller lists (e.g. Top 10, or Top 20 ranking) however, could attenuate the effect as the
relative distance between a top- and bottom-ranked firm declines. Given the varying means of
solicitation, ranked performance dimensions, and sizes of ranked lists, future research could
examine whether each of these factors amplify or attenuate the negative effect of marginal
inclusion.
Audience Characteristics. Second, our study focused on investor response to marginal
inclusion, but there are indeed many other audiences influenced by rankings. Investors, for
instance, primarily consider how information conveyed by rankings is likely to impact future
financial returns. Given that all companies would be evaluated on the same dimension, investors
may treat individual firms like commodities that only differ in terms of their potential future
return. In contrast, individual customers may care more about specific products and brands
which could reduce the number of firms within their consideration set and thus decrease the
relative distance between top-ranked and marginally ranked actors. Future research could thus
examine whether the motives and interests of other key stakeholders (i.e. customers, employees,
media, etc.) moderate the negative effect of marginal inclusion.

28

Historical Attributes. Third, our study evaluated a ranking within a particular time in history,
both the history of the ranking itself and the history of the performance dimension being ranked.
For example, our analysis of the 100 BCC focused on investor responses during the inaugural
year. These findings thus represent responses to a new ranking that represent structural changes
in categories that give new meaning to existing performance metrics. Accordingly, we suspect
that similar results may be found in situations where the ranking provides novel information to
external audiences, either through the creation of a new ranking system or through significant
changes to existing ranking systems that re-categorize criteria in unanticipated ways. In addition,
our analysis was also performed during a time period in which CSR, the dimension of
performance being ranked, was still becoming institutionalized (Carlos and Lewis, 2018;
Flammer, 2013; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007). Consequently,
our findings regarding the negative effects of marginal inclusion could be partially explained by
lack of knowledge and understanding among investors regarding the economic benefits of CSR
investments. For example, one might expect that decreases in firm value could very well be
attenuated by increased acceptance of CSR as a legitimate strategic function. While we are
unable to test this notion using the same context given that it is historically fixed in time, future
research could examine how external audience members respond to rankings over time when the
dimension of performance being ranked becomes perceived as more legitimate (Hawn et al.,
2018; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015).
Conclusion
In summary, we believe our study presents important implications for how ratings may
impact firm performance. Our core finding is that firms at the margin may actually be penalized
rather than rewarded for inclusion on a prestigious ranking. However, we also find that these
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effects may be attenuated by individual firm characteristics reflected in a firm’s reputation within
the same domain the ranking. These results provide provocative new insights into taken for
granted assumptions about the value of receiving positive social evaluations such as rankings,
certifications, or awards. Given the increasing prevalence of these forms of recognition, we
believe additional research in this area is imperative and hope that our findings will inspire future
research that helps to bring forth new insights into this important topic.
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Notes: The vertical axis indicates the abnormal returns on the day of the announcement. Abnormal
returns are computed using the market model. The horizontal axis indicates the 100 BCC Score
with 0 indicating the inclusion threshold. Firms with positive ranks were included on the list while
with negative ranks were excluded. Each dot in the figure represents the average abnormal return
within an optimized bin-width (IMSE) calculated for each side of the threshold using the STATA
command, rdplot with quantile spacing (Calonico et al., 2017; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik,
2015). The solid line plots predicted values of abnormal returns form first-order polynomials in
100 BCC score estimated separately to the left and right of the inclusion threshold. The light gray
lines represented 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Abnormal return on announcement day
KLD index
Total assets ($ million)
Market value ($ million)
ROA
Cash
Leverage
Institutional ownership
Analyst coverage
DS 400
DJSI
B2B industry

N
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
513

Mean Median
-0.003 -0.005
0.893
1
18,698
5,008
17,471
4,689
0.059
0.050
0.072
0.033
0.264
0.274
0.609
0.629
20.856
20
0.626
1
0.072
0
0.708
1

SD
0.029
2.616
50,044
43,588
0.049
0.087
0.145
0.141
12.169
0.484
0.259
0.455

10th %tile
-0.034
-2
590
507
0.006
0.006
0.044
0.405
6
0
0
0

90th %tile
0.026
4
37,156
39,024
0.131
0.209
0.462
0.784
36
1
0
1

Notes: Abnormal returns on the announcement day are computed using the market model. KLD index is measured in
the calendar year prior to the announcement date. All financial variables are obtained from Compustat and computed
in the fiscal year that ends prior to the announcement day. Total assets is the book value of total assets (AT). Market
value is the number of shares outstanding (CSHO) multiplied by the stock price at end of the fiscal year prior to
announcement day (PRCC_F). Return on Assets (ROA) is measured as the ratio of net income (NI) to book value of assets
(AT). Cash is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (CHE) to total assets (AT). Leverage is the ratio of debt in
current liabilities (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT) to total assets (AT). Institutional Ownership is the proportion of shares
owned by institutional investors from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Managers Holdings database in the prior year.
Analyst Coverage is the number of unique analyst estimates in the I/B/E/S database in the prior year. DS 400 and DJSI
are indicator variables equal to 1 if the firm was a member of the Domini Social 400 Index or the Dow Jones Sustainability
Index respectively, and 0 otherwise. B2B industry is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company operates in a
business-to-business (B2B) industry and 0 otherwise. All ratios are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their
empirical distribution.
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Table 2. Preexisting Differences as a Function of the 100 BCC Score
Before Announcement (t-1)

Abnormal return
KLD index
Total assets (log)
Market value (log)
ROA
Cash
Leverage
Institutional ownership (%)
Analyst coverage
DS 400
DJSI
B2B industry

Diff-in-means
(Full Sample)
(1)
-0.002
0.589
3.835
0.000
0.478
0.013
0.984
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.027
0.012
-0.034
0.056
-0.028
0.074
5.806
0.000
0.316
0.000
0.084
0.022
-0.084
0.113

Diff-in-means
[-30, +30]
(2)
-0.012
0.463
0.167
0.714
-0.128
0.771
-0.416
0.341
-0.007
0.601
0.019
0.442
-0.004
0.924
-0.008
0.830
-4.167
0.193
0.200
0.069
-0.033
0.694
-0.100
0.399

Diff-in-means
[-20, +20]
(3)
-0.005
0.669
-0.250
0.651
0.485
0.354
-0.400
0.456
-0.019
0.225
0.027
0.403
0.038
0.402
-0.059
0.194
-5.650
0.131
0.100
0.442
-0.100
0.304
-0.100
0.503

RDD estimate
(Full Model)
(4)
-0.005
0.393
0.357
0.292
-0.048
0.905
-0.593
0.123
-0.010
0.260
-0.005
0.757
0.023
0.412
-0.003
0.907
-2.729
0.336
0.130
0.179
-0.010
0.855
0.031
0.786

Notes: This table tests whether 100 BCC inclusion is systematically related to firm characteristics prior to the
announcement day. All variables are defined in Table 1. Column (1) reports the difference-in-means among all
firms in the sample; Column (2) reports the difference-in-means among all firms that lie within 30 ranks of the
inclusion threshold; Column (3) reports the difference-in-means among all firms that lie within 20 ranks of the
inclusion threshold; Column (4) reports the difference at the inclusion threshold by estimating the global
parametric RDD specification including first-order or second-order polynomials on both sides of the threshold. Pvalues are shown below each estimate.
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Table 3. Results
Panel A. Abnormal Returns Around the Inclusion Threshold
Non-parametric Estimation
All Firms Non-marginal
[-30, +30]
(1)
(2)
(3)
100 BCC Member
-0.001
-0.001
-0.022
(0.001)
(0.004)
(0.008)
0.169
0.742
0.007

[-20, +20]
(4)
-0.027
(0.010)
0.007

R-Squared
0.003
0.000
0.028
0.139
Observations
513
453
60
40
Panel B. Moderating Effects of the Specificity, Consistency, and Materiality of CSR Investments
Specificity of CSR
Consistency of CSR
No
Yes
No
Yes
100 BCC Member

(1)
-0.017
(0.005)
0.002

F-Tests: Differences between columns

R-squared
Observations

(2)
-0.007
(0.007)
0.340

(3)
-0.019
(0.007)
0.005

4.180
0.041
0.038
265

(4)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.363

Parametric Estimation
Full Model
(5)
-0.013
(0.005)
0.005
0.016
513
Relevancy of CSR
No
(5)
-0.017
(0.006)
0.003

4.580
0.033

0.004
248

0.032
219

0.005
294

Yes
(6)
-0.002
(0.008)
0.831
5.060
0.025

0.021
363

0.034
150

Notes. In all regressions, we report coefficients followed by the standard error and respective p-values. Panel A presents regressions of the abnormal returns on
the day of the announcement of the 100 BCC list on the 100 BCC inclusion dummy, i.e. a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is recognized as a member of the
list and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, we explore moderating effects of a prior reputation by splitting the full sample into various subsamples. We test for significant
differences between subsamples using an F-Test in a fully interacted model (i.e. the moderating variable interacted with each covariate from the baseline
parametric model) as shown in the Appendix, Tables A7-A9..
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ONLINE APPENDIX:
Nonparametric and parametric estimation in a regression discontinuity design (RDD)
Conceptually, the treatment effect of BCCi can be estimated by finding the difference in the
average yi for firms just above or below the inclusion threshold. This simplified comparison of means
is known as nonparametic or local estimation (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, 2015). While this computation
does provide an unbiased estimate of 100 BCC inclusion on shareholder value (Flammer, 2015a), it
nevertheless discards firms with scores that are farther away from the threshold which may limit
statistical power (Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012). Fortunately, a more precise estimate can be
calculated by evaluating all ranked firms and approximating the continuous relationship between yi and
Si, allowing for a discontinuity at the inclusion threshold S*. This approach is known as parametric or
global estimation. While this method of estimation is likely to be more precise (i.e. produce smaller
standard errors), it can also produce biased estimates if the functional form between the outcome
variable (yi) and ranking variable (Si) is misspecified. Both methods, nonparametic and parametric
estimation, thus represent a tradeoff between bias and precision. To address these concerns, RD
scholars have suggested that researchers use and compare both estimation methods as a way to
evaluate the robustness of their results (Jacob et al., 2012; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). We follow these
recommendations closely.
Graphical analysis of covariates
We also plot each covariate against the overall BCC score and find no indication of significant
discontinuities at threshold as shown in Figure A3, panels (A) - (L) of the Appendix. We specifically
use the STATA command cmogram to plot each covariate against the overall BCC score. The dashed
vertical line centered at 0 represents the inclusion threshold. Each dot represents the mean of the focal
variable for firms within 50 equally spaced bins. The solid green lines plot predicted values of each
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variable using first- or second-order polynomial functions. The optimal function was determined using
the AIC statistics (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). The light gray lines bounding the predicted values represent
95% confidence intervals.
Robustness tests
In Table A4, we conduct a number of robustness checks to ensure confidence in our baseline
estimate of -1.3%.
Baseline Model. The baseline model, also shown in column (5) of Table 3, includes first-order
polynomials in the 100 BCC score on each side of the threshold using the market model to compute
abnormal returns. Subsequent specifications will vary the details of this baseline specification to
evaluate the robustness of this estimate.
Control Variables. This specification adds all control covariates as shown in Table 2 for year t-1,
with the exception of the Abnormal return variable. If the RD design is valid, we should see no
substantive changes in the coefficient with the inclusion of control variables (Lee & Lemieux, 2010),
signifying that all predetermined covariates are orthogonal to the assignment of “inclusion” or
“exclusion” near the threshold. As shown in column (2), the coefficient is indeed the same when
including all control variables providing support for the validity of our RD design.
Market-Adjusted. We evaluate whether our findings are robust to alternative models for computing
abnormal returns. In column (3), we display the estimated abnormal return using the market adjusted
model (Madsen & Rodgers, 2015). Consistent with the market model, we find a significant -1.3%
decline in firm value on the announcement day. Compared with our baseline estimate in column (1),
this result suggests that our main effect, a decrease in firm value for marginal firms, is not sensitive to
an alternative method of computing abnormal returns.
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Confound Events. We also consider whether our results can be explained by confounding events
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). To address this concern, we exclude from our sample all firms (n = 11)
that announced a dividend, earnings, or a merger or acquisition on the day that the 100 BCC list was
announced. As displayed in column (4), we find nearly identical results when we exclude these 11
firms. This finding suggests that confounding events do not seem to be driving our primary result.
Influence of Outliers. We evaluate whether our main finding is driven by a few large abnormal
returns near the inclusion threshold. To thus address the influence of potential outliers, we first
reestimate the model in column (1) after replacing the dependent variable equal to 1 if the abnormal
return is positive and 0 otherwise. This specification is unlikely to be influenced by outliers given that
the dummy variable ignores the magnitude of the coefficient. As shown in column (5), firms that
barely make the list are 18.2% less likely to experience a positive return on the day of announcement
compared to firms that barely miss the list.
We also test for the influence of outliers by trimming the most extreme observations in the
distribution of abnormal returns (Jacob et al., 2012). Specifically, as shown in columns (6) - (8), we
remove the outermost 1%, 5%, and 10% of the data. This exercise yields a statistically significant
estimate for the effect of marginal inclusion that ranges between 1.0% and 1.3%. This result gives us
confidence that our primary estimate is not being driven by the influence of outliers.
Placebo Cutoffs. As the name of the list describes, the cutoff for inclusion on the 100 BCC list lies
at the 100th ranked firm. To ensure that the discontinuity that we observe is not one that would be
expected by chance alone, we examine alternative placebo cutoffs at the 200th, 300th, 400th, and 500th
ranked firm. Evidence of a significant discontinuity at any of these thresholds would cast doubt that
that observed discontinuity at the 100th firm was not produced by random error. As shown in columns
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(9) - (12), we find no significant discontinuity at any of the placebo cutoffs, which lends strong support
to the validity of our RD specification.
Dynamic RDD. In column (13), we use a dynamic RDD specification to examine whether marginal
inclusion on the 100 BCC has an effect on firm value beyond the announcement day. Following prior
research (Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2012; Flammer, 2015a; Flammer & Bansal, 2017), we account
for multiple days by creating a panel data set in which, for each firm i on announcement day t,
observations at time 𝑡 + 𝜏 are pooled for multiple τ ranging from 𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 + 7. Because observations
before and after the announcement are pooled together, we can include a firm fixed effect 𝛼𝑖 to control
for unobservable firm characteristics that are constant during the analysis window. Similar with our
baseline result, we find a 1.4% decrease in firm value for marginal firms that are included on the list
relative to marginal firms that are excluded. Following the announcement day, however, we find
positive, but small and insignificant abnormal returns. Together these results suggest that investors
react to the information contained in the rankings on the announcement day, when the “new”
information is likely to be most salient.
Moderating effects: Specificity, consistency, and relevancy of CSR investments
Specificity of CSR. We evaluate the specificity of CSR by computing the standard deviation of
ratings amongst the four stakeholder groups evaluated by the BCC list: community, employees,
customers, and shareholders. Firms that have concentrated their investments in one particular domain
are likely to have a higher standard deviation than firms whose investments were spread more equally.
For example, Figure A4 displays the Community Relations, Employee Relations, and Customer
Relations sub-ratings for Timberland Co. (ranked 92nd) and PNC Financial Services Group (ranked
94th). Although both companies had similar BCC scores (hence the similar ranks), it is clear that
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Timberland’s investments in corporate citizenship were more focused on the community whereas
PNC’s investments were spread more evenly across domains.
Consistency of CSR. To evaluate the consistency of CSR, we compute the change in the KLD
index between 1999 (t-1) and 1996 (t-4). We then classify firms into two groups: (1) those whose
change in the KLD index was greater than 0 (No History of CSR) and (2) those whose change in the
KLD index was less than or equal to 0 (History of CSR). Firms with significantly positive differences
are not likely to have a well-established history of CSR investments (see the
For example, Lucent Technologies (ranked 68th) increased its KLD index score (from 1 to 9) from
1996-1999 more than any firm in our sample. While such a sharp increase was enough to catapult
Lucent onto the list, it is unlikely that investors perceived Lucent as having a strong history of making
CSR investments.
Relevancy of CSR. To evaluate the relevancy of CSR, we compute the ratio of a firm’s KLD
strengths that are likely to be considered to be material by the Sustainability Accounting Standards
Board (SASB) to the overall material KLD strengths within an industry. We focus on the KLD
strengths rather than concerns because (1) recent work suggests that KLD’s strengths and concerns
lack convergent validity (Flammer, 2015b, 2018; Flammer & Bansal, 2017; Flammer & Luo, 2017)
and (2) the strengths evaluate proactive activities and initiatives that are largely under the control and
discretion of the firm (Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012) and thus more easy for firm to manipulate in
order for them to manage their socially responsible reputation.
To classify each KLD strength as material or immaterial we follow guidance from the SASB
Materiality Map for each firm in our sample. Firms are allocated to one of 11 sectors and 77 industries
according to the Sustainability Industrial Classification System (SICS).1 For each industry, the SASB

1

We found each firm’s SICS classification using the following URL: https://www.sasb.org/find-your-industry/
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map identifies 26 sustainability-related issues and indicates whether the issue is likely to be material
for companies within that particular industry. We display the materiality map at the sector level in
Table A5. Following guidance from recent research (Khan, Serafeim, & Yoon, 2016), we assign KLD
strength items to a one or more of the 26 identified by the SASB using a mapping provided in Table
A6.
Interaction Effects. We also seek to provide additional transparency by demonstrating that the split
sample analysis used to test the moderating effects of specificity, consistency, and relevance is in fact
equivalent to interacting each variable in the initial parametric model by the moderating variables (see
also Chatterji and Toffel, 2010).
We begin by displaying the subsample results found in Table 3 with the controls for the distance
from the inclusion threshold in as shown in Panel A, Table A7-A9. We then display the full interaction
model in Panel B (the original covariates from the baseline model interacted with the moderating effect
indicator) in order to (1) evaluate the difference between the coefficients in each subsample using an Ftest, and (2) to demonstrate that the interaction analysis leads to the same results as the subsample
analysis.

6

Notes. This figure presents the distribution of 100 BCC scores in the year 2000. The horizontal axis
indicates the standardized 100 BCC score with scores greater than or equal to zero indicating
inclusion on the 100 BCC list. The vertical axis indicates the frequency of 100 BCC scores.
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Figure A2. Manipulation Testing Around the Threshold
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Notes. This figure presents a visualization of the rddensity command in STATA developed by
Cattaneo et al. (2017). The horizontal axis indicates the 100 BCC score (standardized). The vertical
axis indicates the logarithm of the estimated density.
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Figure A3. Graphical analysis of covariates
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Figure A4. Comparison of CSR Specificity
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Notes. Sub-ratings range from a minimum value of 1 to maximum of 5. See the Notes in Table 2
for more information about how the sub-ratings were calculated.
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Table A1. Snapshot of the 100 Best Corporate Citizen's List for the Year 2000
Rank
Overall
Company name
Revenues
Net income
rating
(millions)
(millions)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

4.15167
4.11000
4.04500
4.04167
4.02167
4.01833
3.96000
3.93667
3.87667
3.87000
3.86333
3.84000
3.83833
3.83500
3.83167
3.79333
3.79167
3.79000
3.78000
3.77833

IBM
Hewlett Packard
Intel
Procter & Gamble
Herman Miller
Xerox
Tellabs
Charles Schwab
Fannie Mae
Times Mirror Company
DeVry Incorporated
Pitney Bowes
Solectron
Southwest Airlines
Kroger Company
Compaq Computer
Walt Disney Company
Ben & Jerry's Homemade
Whole Foods Market
The Gap

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

87,548.0
42,370.0
29,389.0
38,125.0
1,766.2
19,228.0
2,319.5
4,713.2
36,968.0
3,029.2
419.4
4,432.6
8,391.4
4,735.6
45,352.0
38,525.0
23,402.0
237.0
1,567.9
11,635.4

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

7,712.0
3,491.0
7,314.0
3,763.0
141.8
1,424.0
559.1
588.9
3,912.0
259.1
38.8
636.2
293.9
474.4
628.0
569.0
1,300.0
3.4
42.2
1,127.1

Total return
to
shareholders

Community
relations

Employee
relations

Customer
relations

61.39%
19.01%
69.26%
32.69%
61.55%
40.94%
57.86%
86.51%
36.84%
21.70%
67.29%
45.73%
66.77%
34.14%
49.04%
64.65%
17.80%
20.20%
61.34%
87.00%

4.50
4.33
3.67
3.83
4.00
4.17
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.33
3.00
4.33
3.00
3.33
3.83
3.17
4.00
4.50
4.17
3.50

4.33
5.00
4.50
4.67
4.83
5.00
3.67
4.33
3.67
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.17
4.50
4.33
3.50
3.83
4.50
4.17
4.00

3.33
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.33
3.00
5.00
3.67
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.33
3.00
3.00
3.00

Notes. This table lists the top 20 companies on the 100 BCC ranking in the year 2000. The community relations measure is a three-year average (1996-1998) of
the KLD community and environmental dimensions. The employee relations measure is a three-year average (1996-1998) of the KLD employee and diversity
dimensions. The consumer relations measure is a three-average (1996-1998) of the KLD product dimension. The total return to shareholders (1996-1998) is
computed using data from Compustat and CRSP. To be consistent with KLD measures, this raw number is converted into quintiles (top 20 percent, next 20
percent, etc.). These four groups are then averaged to compute the overall rating. Financial data (revenues and net income) are obtained from the latest annual
reports that precede the announcement date. For more details see Waddock et al. (2000).
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Table A2. Industry composition by SIC divisions
Included in the
100 BCC
SIC
codes
01-09
10-14
15-17
20-39
40-49
50-51
52-59
60-67
70-89
91-97

Division description
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate
Services
Public Administration
Total

Number
of firms
0
19
6
279
64
14
41
57
33
0
513

Count
0
0
1
54
10
0
10
20
5
0
100

%
0
0
17
19
16
0
24
35
15
0
19

Excluded from the
100 BCC
Count
0
19
5
225
54
14
31
37
28
0
413

%
0
100
83
81
84
100
76
65
85
0
81

Notes. This table displays the industry composition by SIC divisions among firms evaluated by Business Ethics magazine in the year 2000. We also display
subsamples for firms included and excluded for the 100 BCC list. Of the 513 firms in our sample, nearly 20 percent (100/513) were included on the 100 BCC
list. A comparison of included and excluded firms reveals that firms that operate in the Retail Trade (SIC codes 52-59) and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
(SIC codes 60-67) appear to be overrepresented. This result should not be surprising given the strong incentives that consumer facing firms have to maintain
socially responsible reputations (Brammer & Millington, 2008; Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Zhang & Luo, 2013). Other industries notably excluded
from the list include metal mining (SIC Code 10), coal mining (SIC Code 12), and oil and gas extraction (SIC Code 13), likely due to their harmful environmental
impacts.
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Table A3. Polynomial Specification Tests
Polynomial Order
0
1
2
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.004
-0.013
-0.012
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.006)
0.169
0.005
0.056

3
(4)
-0.015
(0.009)
0.082

Distance from Threshold >= 0

0.015
(0.006)
0.006

0.005
(0.015)
0.753

0.048
(0.032)
0.136

Distance from Threshold < 0

0.000
(0.002)
0.966

0.003
(0.007)
0.669

0.001
(0.019)
0.965

(Distance from Threshold >= 0)2

0.007
(0.009)
0.428

-0.065
(0.049)
0.190

(Distance from Threshold < 0)2

0.001
(0.002)
0.666

-0.001
(0.013)
0.953

100 BCC Member

(Distance from Threshold >= 0)3

0.028
(0.018)
0.122

(Distance from Threshold < 0)3

0.000
(0.003)
0.882

AIC
R-Squared
Observations

-2181.7
0.003
513

-2184.1
0.029
513

-2180.8
0.029
513

-2178.3
0.020
513

Notes. This table presents regressions of the abnormal returns on the day of the announcement of the
100 BCC list on the 100 BCC inclusion dummy, i.e. a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
recognized as a member of the list and 0 otherwise. In all regressions, we report coefficients followed
by the standard error and respective p-values. In column (1), the sample consists of all rated and ranked
firms. Column (2)-(4) include controls for distance above and below threshold using first, second, and
third-order polynomials respectively. The AIC statistic is used to evaluate the best fit model.
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Table A4. Robustness Tests
Influence of Outliers

Placebo Cutoffs

Baseline
Model

Control
Variables

Market
Adjusted

Confound
Events

Positive
AR

Trim
(1%)

Trim
(5%)

Trim
(10%)

Cut
(200)

Cut
(300)

Cut
(400)

Cut
(500)

Dynamic
RDD

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

-0.013

-0.013

-0.013

-0.012

-0.182

-0.010

-0.013

-0.013

-0.004

-0.001

0.006

-0.016

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.082)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.022)

0.005

0.003

0.006

0.007

0.027

0.037

0.010

0.025

0.324

0.85

0.183

0.451

100 BCC Member
Coefficient
Standard Error
P-value
Day (t=0)
Coefficient

-0.014

Standard Error

(0.007)

P-value

0.040

One day later (t+1)
Coefficient

0.000

Standard Error

(0.006)

P-value

0.957

Days (t+2) to (t+7)
Coefficient

0.005

Standard Error

(0.017)

P-value
R-squared

0.766
0.016

0.087

0.016

0.014

0.018

0.010

0.012

0.014

0.000

0.003

0.003

0.002

0.183

Observations

513

513

513

502

513

502

463

404

513

513

513

513

2,565

Firms

513

513

513

502

513

502

463

404

513

513

513

513

513
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Table A5: SASB Materiality Map

Dimension

Transportation

Technology and Communication

Services

Resource Transformation

Renewable Resources

Infrastructure

Health Care

Food & Beverage

Financials

Extractive & Minerals Processing

Consumer Goods

SASB Sector

General Issue Category
GHG Emissions
Air Quality

Environment

Energy Management
Water & Wastewater Management
Waste & Hazardous Materials Management
Ecological Impacts
Human Rights & Community Relations
Customer Privacy
Data Security

Social Capital

Access & Affordability
Product Quality and Safety
Customer welfare
Selling Practices & Product Labeling
Labor Practices

Human Capital

Employee Health & Safety
Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion
Product Design & Lifecycle Management

Business Model
& Innovation

Business Model Resilience
Supply Chain Management
Materials Sourcing & Efficiency
Physical Impacts of Climate Change
Business Ethics

Leadership &
Governance

Competitive Behavior
Management of the Legal & Regulatory Environment
Critical Incident Risk Management

Systemic Risk Management
Notes: SASB’s Materiality Map identifies sustainability issues that are likely to affect the financial condition or operating performance
of companies within an industry. In the left-hand column, SASB identifies 26 sustainability-related business issues, or General Issue
Categories, which encompass a range of Disclosure Topics and their associated Accounting Metrics that vary by industry. Dark gray
cells indicate that an issue is likely to be material for more than 40% of industries in a sector. Light gray cells indicate that an issue is
likely to be material for fewer than 50% of industries in a sector. White cells indicate that an issue is not likely to be material for any of
the industries in a sector. See https://materiality.sasb.org for more information.
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Table A6: Issue Level Designation of KLD Strengths Data
KLD Category KLD Rating
KLD Item

SASB Dimension

SASB Issue

Community

com_str_a

Charitable Giving

Social Capital

Human Rights & Community Relations

Community

com_str_b

Innovative Giving

Social Capital

Human Rights & Community Relations

Community

com_str_c

Support for Housing

Social Capital

Human Rights & Community Relations

Community

com_str_d

Support for Education

Social Capital

Human Rights & Community Relations

Diversity

div_str_a

CEO

Human Capital

Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion

Diversity

div_str_b

Promotion

Human Capital

Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion

Diversity

div_str_c

Board of Directors

Human Capital

Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion

Diversity

div_str_d

Work/Life Benefits

Human Capital

Labor Practices

Diversity

div_str_e

Women & Minority Contracting

Human Capital

Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion

Diversity

div_str_f

Employment of the Disabled

Human Capital

Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion

Diversity

div_str_g

Gay & Lesbian Policies

Human Capital

Employee Engagement, Diversity & Inclusion

Employee

emp_str_a

Union Relations

Human Capital

Labor Practices

Employee

emp_str_c

Cash Profit Sharing

Human Capital

Labor Practices

Employee

emp_str_d

Employee Involvement

Human Capital

Labor Practices

Employee

emp_str_f

Retirement Benefits Strength

Human Capital

Labor Practices

Employee

emp_str_g

Health and Safety Strength

Human Capital

Employee Health & Safety

Environment

env_str_a

Beneficial Products and Services

Business Model & Innovation

Product Design & Lifecycle Management

Environment

env_str_b

Pollution Prevention

Environment

Energy Management

Environment

env_str_b

Pollution Prevention

Environment

Waste & Hazardous Materials Management

Environment

env_str_c

Recycling

Business Model & Innovation

Materials Sourcing & Efficiency

Environment

env_str_d

Clean Energy

Environment

Energy Management

Environment

env_str_e

Communications

-------

-------

Product

pro_str_a

Quality

Social Capital

Product Quality & Safety

Product

pro_str_b

R&D/Innovation

-------

-------

Product

pro_str_c

Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged

Social Capital

Access & Affordability

18

Table A7. Moderating Effects of Specific CSR Investments
Panel A. Subsample Analysis
Specificity of CSR
No
Yes
(1)
(2)
-0.017
-0.007
(0.005)
(0.007)
0.002
0.340
0.000
0.000
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.930
0.983
0.023
0.008
(0.007)
(0.009)
0.002
0.369
0.038
0.004
265
248

100 BCC Member

BCC Score < 0

BCC Score ≥ 0

R-squared
Observations
Panel B. Interaction Analysis
[A] 100 BCC Member

-0.017
(0.005)
0.002
0.000
(0.002)
0.930
0.023
(0.007)
0.002
-0.001
(0.006)
0.871
0.010
(0.009)
0.293
0.000
(0.004)
0.950
-0.015
(0.011)
0.178
4.180
0.041
0.019
513

BCC Score < 0

BCC Score ≥ 0

Specificity of CSR

[B]

100 BCC Member × Specificity of CSR

BCC Score < 0 × Specificity of CSR

BCC Score ≥ 0 × Specificity of CSR

F-Test: Coefficient [A] = [B]
R-squared
Observations
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Table A8. Moderating Effects of Consistent CSR Investments
Panel A. Subsample Analysis
Consistency of CSR
No
Yes
(1)
-0.019
(0.007)
0.005
0.001
(0.004)
0.860
0.022
(0.006)
0.000
0.032
219

100 BCC Member

BCC Score < 0

BCC Score ≥ 0

R-squared
Observations
Panel B. Interaction Analysis
[A] 100 BCC Member

-0.019
(0.007)
0.005
0.001
(0.004)
0.860
0.022
(0.006)
0.000
-0.005
(0.006)
0.392
0.013
(0.009)
0.170
-0.001
(0.004)
0.755
-0.015
(0.011)
0.180
4.580
0.033
0.022
513

BCC Score < 0

BCC Score ≥ 0

Consistency of CSR

[B]

(2)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.363
-0.001
(0.003)
0.772
0.007
(0.009)
0.442
0.005
294

100 BCC Member × Consistency of CSR

BCC Score < 0 × Consistency of CSR

BCC Score ≥ 0 × Consistency of CSR

F-Test: Coefficient [A] = [B]
R-squared
Observations
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Table A9. Moderating Effects of Material CSR Investments
Panel A. Subsample Analysis
Materiality of CSR
No
Yes
(1)
-0.017
(0.006)
0.003
0.002
(0.002)
0.491
0.010
(0.008)
0.210
0.021
363

100 BCC Member

BCC Score < 0

BCC Score ≥ 0

R-squared
Observations
Panel B. Interaction Analysis
[A] 100 BCC Member

-0.017
(0.006)
0.003
0.002
(0.002)
0.492
0.010
(0.008)
0.211
-0.008
(0.008)
0.309
0.015
(0.010)
0.139
-0.005
(0.005)
0.314
0.006
(0.011)
0.567
5.060
0.025
0.025
513

BCC Score < 0

BCC Score ≥ 0

Materiality of CSR

[B]

(2)
-0.002
(0.008)
0.831
-0.004
(0.005)
0.428
0.016
(0.007)
0.026
0.034
150

100 BCC Member × Materiality of CSR

BCC Score < 0 × Materiality of CSR

BCC Score ≥ 0 × Materiality of CSR

F-Test: Coefficient [A] = [B]
R-squared
Observations
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Table A10. External validity
Difference-in-means: 100 BCC
Universe
Marginal
Other
p-value
Firms
Firms
[-20, +20]
(1)

(2)

(3)

Difference-in-means: Compustat Universe
100 BCC
Other
p-value
Sample
Firms
(4)

(5)

(6)

Abnormal return on announcement day
0.001
-0.002
0.556
-0.003
-0.002
0.373
KLD index
2.675
0.742
0.000
0.893
0.004
0.000
Total assets (log)
8.514
8.509
0.986
18,698
2,245
0.000
Market value (log)
8.660
8.400
0.348
17,471
1,415
0.000
ROA
0.075
0.058
0.033
0.152
0.001
0.000
Cash
0.086
0.070
0.333
0.078
0.184
0.000
Leverage
0.232
0.267
0.145
0.268
0.243
0.001
Institutional ownership
0.616
0.608
0.745
0.606
0.287
0.000
Analyst coverage
20.125
20.918
0.685
20.856
4.138
0.000
DS 400
0.800
0.611
0.008
0.626
0.004
0.000
DJSI
0.100
0.070
0.544
0.072
0.001
0.000
B2B industry
0.700
0.708
0.914
0.708
0.801
0.000
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) compare the subsample of firms close to (within 20 ranks of) the inclusion threshold with a subsample of
non-close firms (more than 20 ranks away). Columns (4)-(6) compare the 100 BCC Sample with all other publicly listed firms in the
Compustat database. P-values were generated using a two-sample t-test with unequal variances.
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